COIN RUSH IN THE VIRTUAL WILD WEST: THE SEC AS
THE NEW SHERIFF IN TOWN
Alex Forehand*
I. INTRODUCTION
Following the financial crisis of 2008, blockchain-based
technology fostered the development of cryptocurrencies and other
digital assets.1 Consumer interest in these technologies burgeoned
during the pandemic, forcing regulators to take notice.2 Stamping
their deserved space in the financial industry, the combined market
capitalization for all cryptocurrencies surpassed 3 trillion dollars
during a surge in late 2021—far surpassing silver’s market cap, at the
time, of 1.14 trillion.3 The current cryptocurrency market cap is
hovering just above 1 trillion.4
While the future of cryptocurrencies remains unknown, one thing
is guaranteed—where consumer interest journeys, regulators are quick
to follow. For example, in 2019, the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s (SEC) Strategic Hub for Innovation and Financial
Technology (“FinHub”) released a framework (“Framework”) for
when digital assets—”asset[s] that [are] issued and transferred using
distributed ledger or blockchain technology”—may classify as
investment contracts under the Howey test, and, therefore, securities
* J.D. Candidate, 2023, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., University of Virginia, Economics & Psychology.
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See Stablecoins Come with Bank-Like Risks, FIN. TIMES (July 26, 2021),
https://www.ft.com/content/096b9080-cbcc-413d-8053-3d9964db8c5e.
2
See Shalini Nagarajan, The SEC Is Taking a Hard Line on Stablecoins Right Now, BUS.
INSIDER: MKTS. (Oct. 9, 2021, 07:01 AM), https://markets.businessinsider.com/news
/currencies/stablecoin-regulation-sec-federal-reserve-gary-gensler-jerome-powellcowen-2021-10.
3
See Top Assets by Market Cap, COS. MKT. CAP, https://companiesmarketcap.com
/assets-by-market-cap (last visited July 31, 2022); see also Joanna Ossinger, Crypto World
Hits $3 Trillion Market Cap as Ether, Bitcoin Gain, BLOOMBERG: MKTS. (Nov. 8, 2021, 4:06
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-11-08/crypto-world-hits-3trillion-market-cap-as-ether-bitcoin-gain#xj4y7vzkg.
4
See Today’s Cryptocurrency Prices by Market Cap, COIN MKT. CAP,
https://coinmarketcap.com (last visited July 31, 2022).
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subject to SEC governance.5 Other agencies similarly discussed
releasing “crypto asset” regulations in the near future.6
One group of digital assets drawing its fair share of regulatory
attention is stablecoins. In fact, a prolonged struggle between the SEC
and the Federal Reserve over which would govern stablecoins,7
combined with the obvious need to regulate such a prominent
financial instrument, compelled the President’s Working Group to
release a report on stablecoins.8 While the President’s Working Group
clarified that stablecoins may fall under both the SEC’s and the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s (CFTC) jurisdictions, they
requested Congress to quickly enact legislation to ensure that
stablecoins are “subject to a federal prudential framework on a
consistent and comprehensive basis.”9
The chief purpose of this Comment is to highlight why stablecoins
classify as investment contracts under the SEC’s Framework. It is
imperative that those seeking to issue, as well as those seeking to invest
in, stablecoins are aware of when they may be dealing with securities—
for issuers, to abide by their filing and disclosure duties; for investors,
to know the risks involved in their investment.10 This Comment focuses
on why stablecoins classify as securities, rather than on how they should
be regulated.11

5

See Framework for “Investment Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N (Apr. 3, 2019) [hereinafter Framework], https://www.sec.gov/corpfin
/framework-investment-contract-analysis-digital-assets; see also Edward Baer et al., SEC
FRAMEWORK FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A DIGITAL ASSET IS A SECURITY: FIRST ANALYSIS 1
(2019), Lexis: Prac. Guidance (clarifying that “[w]hile the Framework is not a rule,
regulation, or statement of the SEC and is not binding on the SEC or its divisions, it is
an important signal of the SEC’s position on the application of securities law to digital
assets.”).
6
See Peter D. Hardy, Federal Banking Agencies Issue “Crypto Asset Roadmap” for 2022
Guidance,
BALLARD
SPAHR
LLP
(Nov.
29,
2021),
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2021/11/29/federal-banking-agenciesissue-crypto-asset-roadmap-for-2022-guidance-occ-confirms-prior-interpretive-letterson-crypto-but-adds-no-objection-requirement.
7
See Nagarajan, supra note 2.
8
See generally PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., REPORT ON STABLECOINS
(2021),
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/StableCoinReport_Nov1
_508.pdf.
9
Id. at 1–2.
10
See Framework, supra note 5.
11
While this Comment will point to various Acts that stablecoins are subject to as
securities, more specific requirements imposed by these regulations are beyond the
scope of this Comment.
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Part II will detail the recent boom—and a few of the noteworthy
busts—in cryptocurrency, focusing on stablecoins in particular. Part
III will discuss the background to the SEC’s Framework and explicate
the various elements of the Howey test, which the SEC uses as the basis
for analyzing whether digital assets are investment contracts subject to
securities regulation. Part IV will not only show how stablecoins can
qualify as investment contracts under Howey, but also analogize
stablecoins to various types of mutual funds that currently fall under
SEC regulation. The Conclusion will propose that Congress and the
SEC release further guidance on stablecoins to provide a uniform
federal framework for dealing with these complex financial
instruments.
II. AMBIGUITY IN A BUDDING INDUSTRY
A. The Craze
The explosion in blockchain-based technologies in recent years
continues to captivate the attention of consumers and regulators
alike.12 Cryptocurrency’s current trillion-dollar market cap dwarfs the
$200 billion average over recent years.13 Furthermore, the previous
pinnacle amidst the 2018 “crypto bubble” only peaked just below $800
billion, whereas the latest boom surpassed $3 trillion.14
In the early months of 2017, the total market capitalization of all
stablecoins fluctuated around $20 million.15 Fast forward five years to
the summer of 2022, and that market cap erupts to over $150 billion—
an increase more than 7,500 times over.16 As of July 2022, there are six
While
stablecoins with a market cap exceeding $1 billion.17

12

See, e.g., Ryan Harr, U.S. Officials Send Mixed Messages on Crypto Regulation. Here’s
What It All Means for Investors, NEXT ADVISOR (Apr. 18, 2022), https://time.com
/nextadvisor/investing/cryptocurrency/crypto-regulation-talks-heat-up.
13
Total Cryptocurrency Market Cap, COIN MKT. CAP, https://coinmarketcap.com
/charts/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2022).
14
Id.; Ossinger, supra note 3.
15
Raynor de Best, Market Capitalization of the 10 Biggest Stablecoins from January 2017
to June 19, 2022, STATISTA: FIN.
INSTRUMENTS & INVS. (June 29, 2022),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1255835/stablecoin-market-capitalization.
16
Stablecoins
by
Market
Capitalization,
COINGECKO:
STABLECOINS,
https://www.coingecko.com/en/categories/stablecoins (last visited July 31, 2022).
17
See Top Stablecoin Tokens by Market Capitalization, COIN MKT. CAP,
https://coinmarketcap.com/view/stablecoin (last visited July 31, 2022).
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globalization and the need for liquidity continue to grow, it is difficult
to imagine this infatuation slowing down anytime soon.18
With regard to trading activity, Tether—the markets’
predominate stablecoin—has nearly 70 billion coins in circulation,
while its daily trading volume generally fluctuates between 70 and 100
billion, and often beyond.19 At one point in May of 2021, its daily
trading volume reached nearly $290 billion.20 In comparison, Apple—
one of the most desirable stocks today—has nearly 16.2 billion shares
outstanding, but its average volume over the last three months is just
above 90 million.21 While less than half-a-percent of the outstanding
shares are traded each day for one of the most sought-after stocks,
more Tether coins are trading each day than are in circulation—a
bewildering amount of volume for an individual asset.22 Such a
significant amount of money tied up in an asset class with little-to-no
regulation raises genuine concerns over consumer protection and the
legitimacy of these ventures.
B. The Concern
The primary attraction to stablecoins lies in their promise of
maintaining a fixed price relative to a particular asset.23 Such a task is
undeniably no easy feat and contains a wide margin of error. As
mentioned previously, Tether’s daily trading volume often exceeds the
number of coins in circulation, thus complicating the maintenance of
a steady value with such a highly liquid secondary market.24 Far larger
18
See Marco Quiroz-Gutierrez, Bitcoin—Not Gold—Is the New Inflation Hedge, Says
JPMorgan, FORTUNE: FIN. (Oct. 8, 2021, 2:16 PM), https://fortune.com/2021/10/08
/bitcoin-not-gold-is-the-new-inflation-hedge-says-jp-morgan
(explaining
how
institutional investors seem to be replacing gold with Bitcoin as their hedge against
inflation).
19
See Top Stablecoin Tokens by Market Capitalization, supra note 17.
20
Tether Sees $2.3T in Monthly Trading Volume, More than Bitcoin and Ethereum,
ANALYTICS INSIGHT (July 1, 2021), https://www.analyticsinsight.net/tether-sees-2-3t-inmonthly-trading-volume-more-than-bitcoin-and-ethereum.
21
Apple Inc. (AAPL), Statistics, YAHOO! FIN., https://finance.yahoo.com/quote
/AAPL/key-statistics (last visited July 31, 2022).
22
See Top Stablecoin Tokens by Market Capitalization, supra note 17; see also Tether Sees
$2.3T in Monthly Trading Volume, supra note 20; Apple Inc., Statistics, supra note 21.
23
See generally Julian Dossett, What Are Stablecoins and Are They Less Risky? The Details
Crypto Investors Should Know, CNET: MONEY (Sept. 26, 2022, 7:01 PM),
https://www.cnet.com/personal-finance/crypto/stablecoins-what-they-are-how-theywork-and-how-to-buy-them. For a quick primer on stablecoins, see infra notes 92–94.
24
See Top Stablecoin Tokens by Market Capitalization, supra note 17; see also Tether Sees
$2.3T in Monthly Trading Volume, supra note 20; Apple Inc., Statistics, supra note 21.
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of a concern, however, is the collateral backing the nearly 70 billion
coins Tether has in circulation.25 In 2021, Tether came under fire after
disclosing that they held $30 billion dollars of reserves in short-term
commercial paper, making them “the seventh-largest holder of such
debt.”26 For a venture that prides itself on stability, its uncanny reliance
on a less-than-perfectly-stable form of debt is alarming. Because each
Tether coin is not directly backed by its respective dollar, many have
feared the possibility of a bank run.27
The prospect of this nightmare became all too real when Titan—
a governance token used as collateral to stabilize the value of the
algorithmic stablecoin,28 Iron29—plummeted from sixty dollars to
virtually nothing in a matter of hours when “whale accounts” offloaded
massive amounts of shares.30 With the underlying collateral pulled out
from under it, the smart contract—”a self-executing contract with the
terms” written directly into lines of code31—temporarily froze coin
holders’ ability to redeem coins,32 causing a phenomenon synonymous

25

See Zeke Faux, Anyone Seen Tether’s Billions?, BLOOMBERG: BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 7,
2021, 2:25 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-10-07/cryptomystery-where-s-the-69-billion-backing-the-stablecoin-tether.
Those
reserve
breakdowns have since changed. See TETHER: TRANSPARENCY, RESERVES BREAKDOWN
(2022), https://tether.to/en/transparency/#reports.
26
Faux, supra note 25.
27
See Stablecoins Come with Bank-Like Risks, supra note 1 (emphasizing that
stablecoins “combine the potential for bank runs . . . with the all but non-existent
regulation of cryptocurrency”); see also Camomile Shumba, IMF Warns of the Danger to
the Financial System from ‘Disappearing’ Crypto Coins and the Instability of Stablecoins, YAHOO!
FIN. (Oct. 13, 2021), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/imf-warns-danger-financialsystem-115144109.html (“The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has issued a
warning about the growing risks in the expanding cryptocurrency space, including . . .
potential ‘runs’ on seemingly more stable assets ….”); Faux, supra note 25 (noting a
lack of reassurance that Tether always had enough cash to pay out the requests of a
single day because “[b]ank runs can last longer than 24 hours”).
28
For an explanation of algorithmic stablecoins, see discussion infra Part IV.
29
See Analysis of the TITAN Token Collapse: Iron.Finance Rugpull or DeFi Bank Run?,
CIPHER TRACE (June 21, 2021), https://ciphertrace.com/analysis-of-the-titan-tokencollapse-iron-finance-rugpull-or-defi-bank-run.
30
See Shumba, supra note 27.
31
See Jake Frankenfield, Smart Contracts, INVESTOPEDIA: BLOCKCHAIN (Mar. 24,
2022), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/smart-contracts.asp.
32
Id. “A smart contract is a self-executing contract with the terms of the agreement
between buyer and seller being directly written into lines of code” that exist on a
blockchain network. Id.
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to a bank run.33 It seems Iron Finance overestimated their ability to
“remove bank run risks . . . and ensure[] FULL redeemability.”34
Fortunately, the Iron debacle drew a disproportionate amount of
attention because investor Mark Cuban got “hit like everyone else” and
subsequently called on regulators to take initiative in defining
stablecoins and imposing regulations.35 If a prominent investor as
savvy as Mark Cuban could fall victim to the ambiguity surrounding
stablecoins, it is expected that the lack of clarity regarding the
collateral backing various stablecoin schemes has the potential to
wreak havoc on uninformed retail investors. Unfortunately, however,
the Iron fracture proved an insufficient warning to stablecoin issuers.
Fast forward less than a year later and the chilling downfall of
Terra exposes that retail investors are far from the only ones to fear.
While a comprehensive analysis into Terra’s deterioration is beyond
the scope of this Comment, the basic explanation can be broken down
as follows: When the value of Terra’s stablecoin, UST, slipped from its
peg by just over a cent, fear sparked, and a bank run—combined with
massive and unrelenting short positions on UST’s stabilizing token,
Luna—pulverized the price to fractions of a cent.36 This time,
however, the $18 billion stablecoin giant left a gaping hole in the
crypto community at large, dragging down hedge funds and exchanges
alike.37 While the repercussions are still weighing on the industry,
regulators, among others, noticed these concerns and are beginning

33

See
Iron
Finance
Post-Mortem,
IRON
FIN.
(June
17,
2021),
https://ironfinance.medium.com/iron-finance-post-mortem-17-june-20216a4e9ccf23f5.
34
See IRON Stablecoin v2 Design, IRON FIN. (Aug. 10, 2021),
https://ironfinance.medium.com/iron-stablecoin-v2-design-44a006b5b8b (emphasis
in original).
35
See Emily Graffeo, Mark Cuban Says He Lost Money Trading a DeFi Token Called
Titan that Crashed from $60 to Zero in One Day, BUS. INSIDER: MKTS. (June 17, 2021, 3:29
PM),
https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/mark-cuban-says-he-lostmoney-trading-defi-token-titan-that-crashed-to-zero-2021-6; see also Kevin Reynolds, In
Token Crash Postmortem, Iron Finance Says It Suffered Crypto’s ‘First Large-Scale Bank Run,’
YAHOO! (June 17, 2021), https://www.yahoo.com/now/iron-finance-says-sufferedcrypto-170918275.html.
36
Krisztian Sandor & Ekin Genç, The Fall of Terra: A Timeline of the Meteoric Rise and
Crash of UST and LUNA, COINDESK (June 1, 2022), https://www.coindesk.com/learn
/the-fall-of-terra-a-timeline-of-the-meteoric-rise-and-crash-of-ust-and-luna.
37
MacKenzie Sigalos, From $10 Billion to Zero: How a Crypto Hedge Fund Collapsed and
Dragged Many Investors Down with It, CNBC: CRYPTO WORLD (July 11, 2022, 3:30 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/07/11/how-the-fall-of-three-arrows-or-3ac-draggeddown-crypto-investors.html.
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to sort out where exactly stablecoins fit within the existing regulatory
framework.38
III. THE NEED FOR REGULATION AND THE SEC’S RESPONSE
A. Howey: The Original
With a proliferation of digital assets entering the market, the SEC
quickly realized the need to issue guidance for those seeking to create
and offer digital assets.39 Both the SEC and federal courts utilize the
analysis of an “investment contract” to ascertain when “unique or novel
instruments or arrangements, such as digital assets,” qualify as
securities subject to SEC jurisdiction.40 Because of the novelty and
complexity of digital assets, the SEC found it essential to release
guidance on the governance of these assets to provide consumers with
greater knowledge concerning their investments.41
The Framework centers around the analysis spelled out in SEC v.
W. J. Howey Co., which involved “the application of § 2(1) of the
Securities Act of 1933 to an offering of units of a citrus grove
development coupled with a contract for cultivating, marketing and
remitting the net proceeds to the investor.”42 In this infamous case,
the Supreme Court held that the scheme constituted an investment
contract because purchasers contributed money with the goal of
sharing the profits derived from the management and ownership of a
large citrus operation, rather than derived through their own
occupation and development.43 In short, the buyers were investors
rather than farmers. Howey and its progeny consistently define
“investment contracts” as “the investment of money in a common

38
See PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 8, at 15; see, e.g.,
Christina Pazzanese, Regulators Put Cryptocurrency in Crosshairs, HARV. GAZETTE: BUS. &
ECON. (Sept. 29, 2021), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2021/09
/regulating-the-unregulated-cryptocurrency-market (“SEC Chairman Gary Gensler
called cryptocurrency an asset class “rife with fraud, scams, and abuse” and said
investors don’t have enough regulatory protection from the swarms jumping into
crypto finance, issuance, trading, and lending.”).
39
See Framework, supra note 5.
40
Id. SEC regulation imposes certain filing requirements and requires various
disclosures. The SEC also prescribes that the information be complete and not
materially misleading. Id.
41
Id.
42
See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 294 (1946).
43
Id. at 299–300.
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enterprise with a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from
the efforts of others.”44
Because individuals purchased these contracts from the company
itself, the Court had no problem finding “an investment of money in a
common enterprise.”45 Further, the Howey Company’s promise to
share the profits from the respectively owned tracts of land permitted
the Court to establish that purchasers had a reasonable expectation of
profits.46 The Court focused on the essential efforts of the citrus
operation to deliver returns and a lack of effort on behalf of the
purchasers, noting that “the promoters manage, control and operate
the enterprise,” while investors simply “provide the capital and share
in the earnings.”47 Emphasizing the difficulty individual purchasers
faced when seeking to earn a profit themselves due to a “lack [of]
equipment and experience requisite to the cultivation,” the Court
stressed that Howey’s “personnel and equipment” were imperative “if
the investors [were] to achieve their paramount aim of a return on
their investments.”48 The Court further noted that users had no
intention of exerting their own efforts but rather were “attracted solely
by the prospects of a return on their investment.”49 Thus, the Court
unambiguously held that the Howey Company offered investment
contracts that should have been registered with the SEC.50
B. Howey in the Digital Age
FinHub’s Framework breaks the Howey test down into four parts:
(1) the investment of money (2) in a common enterprise (3) with a
reasonable expectation of profits (4) derived from the efforts of
others.51 The Framework immediately clarifies that the first two prongs
are generally satisfied when a digital asset is offered and primarily
focuses on the latter two elements.52 The Framework explains that the
investment of money typically exists “in an offer and sale of a digital
44

Framework, supra note 5; Howey, 328 U.S. at 298; United Hous. Found., Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975); SEC v. Telegram Grp., 448 F. Supp. 3d 352, 365
(S.D.N.Y. 2020).
45
See Howey, 328 U.S. at 299–300.
46
Id. at 299.
47
Id. at 300.
48
Id. at 299–300.
49
Id. at 300.
50
Id. at 301.
51
See generally Framework, supra note 5.
52
Id.
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asset because the digital asset is purchased or otherwise acquired in
exchange for value”—regardless of the form the consideration takes.53
Similarly conclusive is their finding “that a ‘common enterprise’
typically exists” in the offering of a digital asset.54 Because of the
Framework’s emphasis on the last two prongs, this analysis will likewise
narrow its focus to the reasonable expectation of profits derived from
the efforts of others.55
1. Reliance on the Efforts of Others
In determining when a purchaser is relying on the efforts of
others, two questions must be asked. First, “[d]oes the purchaser
reasonably expect to rely on the efforts of an” Active Participant
(AP)?56 If so, the next question is whether those efforts are “‘the
undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which
affect the failure or success of the enterprise,’ as opposed to efforts that
are more ministerial in nature?”57 If the answer to both questions is
“yes,” then a purchaser is relying on the efforts of others. To help
answer the second question, the SEC provides a list of characteristics
that indicate a reliance on the efforts of others, carefully noting that
“[a]lthough no one of the following characteristics is necessarily
determinative, the stronger their presence, the more likely it is that a
purchaser of a digital asset is relying on the ‘efforts of others.’”58
According to the Framework, consumers are more likely to rely
on the efforts of others when an AP manages “the development, []
operation, or promotion of the network” or digital asset.59 This is
particularly true when users “expect an AP to be performing or
overseeing tasks that are necessary for the . . . digital asset to achieve
or retain its intended purpose or functionality.”60 Reliance on the
efforts of others is also more likely to exist when these tasks are

53

Id.
Id. Although it can be argued that there are many instances where a common
enterprise may not exist, such as in certain decentralized currencies, because this
Comment focuses on centralized stablecoins, the common enterprise section is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
55
See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
56
See Framework, supra note 5. The Framework defines an AP as a “promoter,
sponsor, or other third party (or affiliated group of third parties).” Id.
57
Id. (quoting SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973)).
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
54
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“expected to be performed by an AP, rather than an unaffiliated,
dispersed community of network users.”61 Further, when an AP plays
a key role in “deciding governance issues, code updates, or how third
parties participate in the validation of transactions” involving the
digital asset, reliance is more likely to be found.62 The key with each
of these factors is that a third party must be responsible for maintaining
the functionality of the network or digital asset rather than the
consumers themselves. Contrarily, if the digital asset is self-sustainable
and an AP no longer affects its success, consumers are not relying on
the efforts of others.63
When an AP establishes or otherwise embraces a market for the
digital asset, including by “control[ling] the creation and issuance of
the digital asset; or [by] tak[ing] other actions to support a market
price of the digital asset,” these actions weigh towards finding a
reliance on the efforts of others.64 Actions that support a market price
include “limiting supply or ensuring scarcity, through, for example,
buybacks, ‘burning,’ or other activities.”65 Reliance on the efforts of
others is also more likely to exist when an AP has an ongoing
managerial role in deciding “whether and where the digital asset will
trade.”66 This is even more true when the “AP has arranged, or
promised to arrange for, the trading of the digital asset on a secondary
market or platform.”67
2. Reasonable Expectation of Profits
The final prong of the Framework considers whether the
purchaser has a reasonable expectation of profits.68 The Framework
notes—in reference to the Supreme Court’s definition in United
Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman69—that “[p]rofits can be, among other
things, capital appreciation resulting from the development of the
initial investment or business enterprise or a participation in earnings
resulting from the use of purchasers’ funds.”70 The Framework goes
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

Id.
Framework, supra note 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Framework, supra note 5.
Id.
Id. (citing United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975)).
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on to observe that purchasers can also reasonably expect to earn a
profit when “[t]he digital asset is transferable or traded on or through
a secondary market or platform.”71 Thus, by specifying “among other
things,” it seems clear that the SEC was not restricting profits to just
“capital appreciation” or “a participation in earnings,” but that profits
may also derive from trading or transferring on a secondary market.72
The Framework was quick to clarify, however, that “[p]rice
appreciation resulting solely from external market forces (such as
general inflationary trends or the economy) impacting the supply and
demand for an underlying asset” does not qualify as “profit” under
Howey.73
In addition to the potential profit a secondary exchange promises
when the AP markets the digital asset—”directly or indirectly”—in ways
that emphasize its ability to earn a profit, the SEC is more inclined to
find a reasonable expectation of profits on behalf of the purchaser.74
In particular, when the AP emphasizes “[t]he availability of a market”
where the digital asset can be traded, the SEC finds a reasonable
expectation of profits is more likely to exist.75 This is “particularly
[true] where the AP implicitly or explicitly promises to create or
otherwise support a trading market for the digital asset.”76 Further, the
Framework makes clear that when “[t]he ready transferability of the
digital asset is a key selling feature,” the SEC is more willing to find an
expectation of profits.77
The Framework finishes its discussion on the expectation of
profits by noting various circumstances in which a purchaser may no
longer expect to derive profits from the digital asset. Digital assets that
have proved “a direct and stable correlation to the value of the good
or service for which it may be exchanged or redeemed[,]” are less likely
to provide consumers with a reasonable expectation of profits.78
Further, when “holders are then able to use the digital asset for its
intended functionality,” the attraction likely lies in its consumptive use
rather than its prospect for appreciation.79
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Id.
Id.
Id.
Framework, supra note 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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3. Other Relevant Considerations
When determining whether the elements of Howey are satisfied,
“federal courts look to the economic reality of the transaction.”80 To
be clear, the focal point of the Framework is not just on the structure
and terms of the digital asset, “but also [] the circumstances
surrounding the digital asset and the manner in which it is offered,
sold, or resold.”81 This inquiry characterizes the instrument according
to “the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the economic
inducements held out to the prospect.”82 The analysis is objective and
“depends on the specific facts and circumstances” surrounding each
digital asset.83
The Framework ends by enumerating various other
considerations the SEC deems relevant, though not determinative, to
the analysis of an investment contract. The more prominent these
characteristics are, “the less likely the Howey test is met.”84 The SEC
struggles to find a reliance on the efforts of others when the network
or digital asset is “fully developed and operational.”85 Fully developed
and operational networks, while rare, are those that no longer need
improvement and can instantly be used for their designated purpose.86
This is particularly true when the digital asset’s use is restricted to the
network and can only “be held or transferred [] in amounts that
correspond to a purchaser’s expected use” of the asset.87 In this
respect, the Framework observes that when the digital asset in question
is a virtual currency, its immediate ability “to make payments in a wide
variety of contexts [] or act[] as a substitute for real (or fiat) currency”
decreases the likelihood that a digital asset is an investment contract.88

80

Framework, supra note 5.
Id.
82
Id. (citing SEC v. C.M. Joinder Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 352–53 (1943)).
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Framework, supra note 5.
87
Id.
88
Id. In addition, virtual currencies that effectively act “as a store of value” are less
suitable to classification as a security under Howey. Something that qualifies “as a store
of value” is capable of being “saved, retrieved, and exchanged for something of value
at a later time.” Id.
81
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IV. STABLECOINS AS SECURITIES
This Part first provides a brief background on stablecoins. It will
then illustrate how stablecoins satisfy the Framework by providing a
reasonable expectation of profits derived from the efforts of others
and, consequently, classify as securities subject to SEC regulation. It
will also analogize stablecoins to money market mutual funds, which
also fall under the SEC’s jurisdiction. Because stablecoins are
potentially classified as different types of securities, the SEC should
release further guidance to clarify which set of regulations stablecoin
issuers must abide by and under what circumstances. Similarly,
because stablecoins may resemble other assets—such as
commodities—in various circumstances, it is important for Congress
to encourage the implementation of a cohesive federal framework
surrounding stablecoins.
Public skepticism in financial institutions—both centralized and
private—following the 2008 financial crisis catalyzed the development
of blockchain-based currencies.89 While cryptocurrencies such as
Bitcoin and Ethereum were early pioneers in alternative currency,
cryptocurrency’s instability and constant price fluctuation ultimately
remained a barrier to many consumers entering the blockchain
sphere.90 Recognizing a market for consumers wary of both
institutional finance as well as volatile cryptocurrency, companies
began issuing stablecoins.91
Stablecoins sustain a stable price by tying (also known as
“pegging” or “tethering”) their value to an underlying asset or bundle
of assets.92 The underlying asset can be virtually anything, from fiat
currencies such as the U.S. dollar and the Chinese yuan, to
commodities, such as oil and gold.93 Pegging to another asset can be
achieved through (1) holding various forms of collateral, such as fiat
currencies or physical gold, in reserve and issuing coins as the
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See Stablecoins Come with Bank-Like Risks, supra note 1.
Usman W. Chohan, Are Stable Coins Stable?, Notes on the 21st Century, CRITICAL
BLOCKCHAIN RSCH. INITIATIVE, Mar. 29, 2020, at 1, 2.
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The process of creating a stablecoin on blockchain is commonly referred to as
“minting.” See What Are Stablecoins?, GEMINI: CRYPTOPEDIA, (June 28, 2022),
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See EVA SU, CONG. RSCH. SERV., DIGITAL ASSETS AND SEC REGULATION 16 (2021).
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See, e.g., Gemini Dollar, GEMINI, https://www.gemini.com/dollar (last visited July
31, 2022); GOLD COIN, https://goldcoin.com (last visited July 31, 2022); Jake
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collateral comes in; (2) carefully calculating arrangements with other
assets, such as investing in money market accounts or short-term
corporate debt; or (3) utilizing an algorithm designed to maintain the
stablecoins’ value by buying and selling as needed.94 When companies
rely exclusively on the first method of pegging—issuing a coin every
time the corresponding collateral is received and maintaining that
collateral in a secure vault or savings account—the argument for
treating stablecoins as securities becomes more attenuated.95 As will
be discussed below, however, holding the underlying asset in reserve
in an amount equal to the number of outstanding coins is rarely the
exclusive method stablecoin issuers utilize.96
This Part will focus on currency-pegged stablecoins97 and show
how they independently satisfy the Howey test due to the complex
efforts stablecoin issuers endure to maintain a stable value and the
reasonable expectation of profits from earned interest. It will also
analogize stablecoins to SEC-registered mutual funds and exchangetraded funds (ETFs) due to their overwhelming similarities in
management.98 While there are many different types of mutual funds,
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See Chohan, supra note 90, at 2–3, 6.
Id. at 2–4.
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See, e.g., Reserves Breakdown, supra note 25; CAMERON WINKLEVOSS, INDEPENDENT
ACCOUNTANTS’ REPORT: GEMINI DOLLAR AND CASH BALANCES AS OF AUGUST 31ST, 2021 3
(2021),
https://assets.ctfassets.net/jg6lo9a2ukvr/3U43d7lUPmunUNLa0f9xui
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Commodity-pegged and crypto-pegged stablecoins are the other two most
prominent types of stablecoins and attempt to track the value of a specific commodity
or cryptocurrency, respectively. See What Are Stablecoins?, supra note 91. These
stablecoin classes are beyond the scope of this Comment.
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Mutual funds and ETFs are “investment compan[ies] that pool[] money from
many investors and invest[] the money in stocks, bonds, short-term money-market
instruments, other securities or assets, or some combination of these investments.” See
Mutual Funds and Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs) –– A Guide for Investors, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N. (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investorpublications/investorpubsinwsmfhtm.html. Because stablecoins are both offered
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this analysis focuses primarily on bond funds,99 alternative funds,100 and
money-market funds.101 Again, because of their resemblance to several
securities within the SEC’s jurisdiction, it is imperative that the SEC
release further guidance on stablecoins. Alongside a more stablecoinspecific framework from the SEC, Congress should release a
complementary federal framework detailing the interplay between
agencies such as the SEC and CFTC.
A. When Howey Met Currency-Pegged Stablecoins
Currency-pegged stablecoins are exactly that—stablecoins whose
underlying value is tied to a traditional fiat currency.102 This Section
will highlight how these stablecoins meet the Framework’s definition
of an investment contract due to the elaborate efforts coin issuers exert
to preserve a stable value and their endorsement of high interest rates
available on primary and secondary lending platforms that allow
consumers to reasonably expect a profit. Because stablecoins also
resemble money market mutual funds, however, the SEC must clarify
which regulations they will subject stablecoins to.
1. Howey: Reliance on the Efforts of Others
Stablecoin purchasers rely on the efforts of others because an
AP—rather than the purchaser or a dispersed network—manages the
“development, [] operation, [and] promotion” of stablecoins, and
those efforts are the “undeniably significant ones” controlling the fate
of the stablecoin.103
As mentioned previously, stablecoins—particularly, currencypegged stablecoins—rarely rely exclusively on the first method of
pegging but, instead, employ a combination of strategies designed to
perpetuate stability.104 These strategies, in turn, amplify the difficulty
in maintaining a consistent value and require “undeniably significant”
efforts on behalf of the coin issuers. Gemini, a blockchain-focused
99

Mutual Funds and Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs) –– A Guide for Investors, supra note
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100
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financial platform, for example, pegs its stablecoin one-to-one to the
U.S. dollar and embodies the most common structure for a
stablecoin,105 not only in terms of its exchange ratio but also in its
method of pegging.106 Gemini asserts that “[f]or [every] Gemini dollar
issued, the Company has received one corresponding U.S. dollar,”
which they hold in “one or more omnibus bank accounts” and/or “one
or more money market accounts.”107 Thus, although Gemini holds
some of their reserves in secure bank accounts, they also have exposure
to money market accounts, which are inherently riskier than cash—
albeit by a modest amount.108
Other companies, including Tether, similarly invest their reserves
in “cash equivalent” forms of collateral but are slightly more liberal in
their definitions of “cash equivalent.”109 Tether, pegged one-to-one
with the U.S. dollar, admits in their whitepaper that their “[r]eserves
include traditional currency, cash equivalents and, from time to time,
may include other assets and receivables from loans.”110 These “cash
equivalents” include various types of “secure” debt, such as short-term
commercial paper, Treasury bills, and reverse repo notes.111
Creating a diverse portfolio of assets in an attempt to maintain a
stable value is no easy feat and requires constant attention and
adjustments as market forces drive interest rates in circles. This system,
requiring persistent maintenance, is far from a self-sustaining asset no
longer affected by an AP.112 Because the price of any stablecoin would
waver in the wake of so many moving parts without continuous
surveillance and restructuring, the efforts of the coin issuer are “those
essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the
105

A one-to-one peg to the U.S. dollar means that one coin is exchangeable for one
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See WINKLEVOSS, supra note 96, at 3.
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See, e.g., James McWhinney, Money Market Mayhem: The Reserve Fund Meltdown,
INVESTOPEDIA: BANKING (Oct. 31, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/articles
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enterprise” and are mandatory for the stablecoin to “retain its intended
purpose or functionality”—namely, maintaining a stable value.113
Just like the consumers in Howey lacked the equipment and
experience needed to cultivate the citrus grove,114 consumers similarly
lack the equipment and knowledge required to create and maintain
an asset with a stable value. Minting a single stablecoin poses
equipment and coding challenges by itself, let alone raising the
requisite capital to maintain a diverse portfolio capable of sustaining
an army of coins.115 Accordingly, “an AP, rather than an unaffiliated,
dispersed community,”116 oversees essential tasks, such as creating the
token and “deciding governance issues [and] code updates.”117
Because consumers have no impact on maintaining the
stablecoin’s value (nor does a dispersed group of network users) and
because the price of the coin would swing without someone overseeing
it, consumers must rely on the efforts of others.
2. Howey: Reasonable Expectation of Profits
The reasonable expectation of profits for currency-pegged
stablecoins lies in the emphasis stablecoin issuers place on the high
interest rates available to consumers.118 As recognized in the
Framework, when a digital asset is “transferable or traded on . . . a
secondary market,” a reasonable expectation of profit is more likely to
exist.119 This is particularly true when an “AP implicitly or explicitly
promises to create or otherwise support a trading market for the digital
asset.”120 Gemini, a crypto-based company founded by the Winklevoss
twins,121 created a secondary trading and lending platform called
Gemini Earn, which touts up to 8 percent interest when users lend its
113

Id.
See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299–300 (1946).
115
Creating a single stablecoin will not give it the necessary utility to be able to be
lent at such high interest rates. It is only when there are billions of coins that have
consistently maintained their peg that institutions trust the coin enough to be willing
to pay abnormally steep interest rates.
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Framework, supra note 5.
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See, e.g., Gemini Earn, GEMINI, https://www.gemini.com/earn (last visited July 31,
2022); Where You Can Trade, BINANCE, https://www.binance.com/en/busd (last visited
July 31, 2022).
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See Framework, supra note 5.
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stablecoin Gemini dollar.122 When consumers purchase Gemini
dollar—or any stablecoin for that matter—on Gemini Earn, Gemini
can automatically lend their coins for them, earning them interest
without any further affirmative action on their part beyond purchasing
the coins. Binance also spotlights—as one of only two uses—its
stablecoin’s ability to earn interest through lending and directs users
to over twenty-five secondary trading platforms.123 Similar marketing
appears on nearly every stablecoin’s website—whether the company
employs their own lending platform or points users to secondary
platforms.124 These secondary platforms offer even higher interest
rates—upwards of 12 percent.125
While the expectation of profits clearly derives from the efforts of
an AP when the same company that issues the stablecoin also maintains
its lending platform, the connection is only slightly more difficult when
stablecoin companies rely on third parties for the same. The
Framework clarifies, however, that creating the secondary market is
not mandatory so long as the issuer “otherwise support[s] a trading
market for the digital asset.”126 Additionally, the SEC considers the
“economic reality” of the transaction and the investment scheme as a
whole, rather than whether the isolated asset is inherently a security.127
Minting stablecoins on blockchain makes them tradable on
decentralized, peer-to-peer exchanges—even if a centralized lending
platform is unavailable—and by not only permitting, but encouraging,
users to trade on these secondary exchanges, stablecoin issuers
sufficiently support a trading market for their coin.
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Further evidence that stablecoins trading on secondary exchanges
constitute securities for regulatory purposes is the Wells Notice—”a
formal notice from the SEC informing a recipient that the agency is
planning to bring enforcement actions against them”128—Coinbase
received for its proposed program Lend, which would allow consumers
to earn up to 4 percent interest by lending the stablecoin USD Coin.129
The SEC warned Coinbase that, after analyzing Lend through the lens
of Howey, “they consider Lend to involve a security.”130
Although it may be argued that lending programs, but not
stablecoins, are securities, the focus of the Howey analysis is on the
economic reality of the transaction, and the reality is that consumers
purchase stablecoins expecting to passively earn a profit.131 Further,
the Framework focuses not only on the structure and terms of the
digital asset itself, “but also on the circumstances surrounding the
digital asset and the manner in which it is offered, sold, or resold.”132
Thus, the SEC would likely view the lending programs in conjunction
with the stablecoins themselves. While the attraction lies in the
“consumptive” use of lending the stablecoin, consumers are still
relying on the efforts of an AP to uphold the coin’s integrity and,
consequently, retain its ability to be lent profitably. Further, this is only
one factor in a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis focusing on the
economic reality, which ultimately shows consumers are relying on
third parties to maintain a coin’s value so that it can be lent profitably.
The ability to earn a higher interest rate on these platforms is only
possible because of the company’s efforts to maintain a coin’s
consistent value. This is not the case where “solely . . . external market
forces . . . [are] impacting the supply and demand” of the coin, causing
its price to appreciate.133 In fact, stablecoins are designed to prevent
appreciation—particularly appreciation caused by the supply and
demand on a secondary exchange.134 Rather, the coin’s value—and,
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consequently, profit—derives from its ability to be lent at such high
interest rates on secondary exchanges.135 And because stablecoins can
only be lent at such high interest rates if the company successfully
promotes its coin and consistently maintains a fixed value, “external
market forces” are not exclusively what give consumers an expectation
of profit, but, alternatively, the internal efforts of the stablecoin issuer
itself matter.136 If the company’s efforts fail and the price of the coin
fluctuates, as do many traditional cryptocurrencies, it becomes hard to
imagine anyone would be willing to pay such an exorbitant interest
rate to borrow an unstable asset. Further, by including the word
“solely,” the SEC likely wished to exclude from the definition of profit
cases where a digital asset is created and then left untouched—with its
price to be bound between the struggles of supply and demand. Due
to the complex efforts of APs mentioned above, if stablecoins were left
untouched and subject exclusively to the influences of market forces,
the intrinsic properties that give them value would vanish.137 Thus, the
reasonable expectation of profits can only exist when the AP exerts
reasonable efforts to maintain a consistent value, and, therefore, the
profits can be said to derive from those efforts.
The Framework further notes that when “[t]he ready
transferability of the digital asset is a key selling feature,” a reasonable
expectation of profits is more likely to exist.138 Thus, because
stablecoin issuers are quick to point to an abundance of secondary
exchanges where their coins can be traded and lent, it is hard to deny
that immediate transferability is a principal selling point.139 The fact
that stablecoins’ primary method of earning profit is through these
exchanges, an AP’s emphasis on these secondary exchanges further
supports an expectation of profits.140 Since, when held in a wallet,
there is otherwise little difference between traditional currency and
the digital representation of such on blockchain, if the consumer was
not looking to lend the stablecoin for a profit, they would presumably
keep their money in traditional fiat currency to avoid the possibility of
the stablecoin losing its peg. Thus, while possible that one purchases
135
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stablecoins without the intention of lending them, the economic
reality of an overwhelming majority of cases will reveal that consumers
are purchasing these coins with the expectation of earning high
interest.
Because stablecoin issuers market their stablecoin’s ability to be
transferred on a secondary platform and further emphasize its ability
to earn high interest rates, consumers reasonably expect to earn a
profit.
3. Other Relevant Considerations
Finally, balancing all the other relevant considerations—the
economic reality of the transaction and the manner in which
stablecoins are offered, sold, and resold—supports the finding that
stablecoins are investment contracts. Although the overwhelming
presence of these factors leads one to believe that stablecoins are
securities, the Howey test is still fact-specific, focusing on the specific
circumstances surrounding each digital asset.141
The economic reality of stablecoins is that investors purchase
these coins expecting the issuer to endure significant efforts to
maintain their value so that the investors can earn astronomical
interest rates on secondary exchanges. Thus, consumers reasonably
expect to earn a profit, and those profits can only be derived from the
complex efforts of an AP. Looking at “the terms of the offer, the plan
of distribution, and the economic inducements held out to the
prospect,”142 stablecoins check all the boxes for securities. Not only
can stablecoins be bought, sold, and transferred on secondary
exchanges, but issuers actually encourage stablecoin holders to do so.143
Thus, the economic inducement held out to consumers is the prospect
of earning exceptional yield simply by lending their coins.144
The SEC also has trouble finding an investment contract when
the digital asset is “fully developed and operational[,]” as investors
would not expect the AP to engage in any efforts to promote the digital
asset at that point.145 Stablecoins, however, are never fully developed
but, rather, are constantly adjusting to the demands of the market in
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See Gemini Earn, supra note 118 (emphasis added).
See discussion supra note 125.
See Framework, supra note 5.
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order to hold their peg.146 Maintaining a fixed price relative to another
asset, without respect to market forces on the derivative asset, prevents
stablecoins from fully developing because of the underlying asset’s
constant price fluctuation. Supply and demand therefore prevent
stablecoins from developing to a point beyond that which requires
constant attention. In an effort to mitigate the effects of market forces,
stablecoin issuers regularly engage in “minting” and “burning”
stablecoins and are always developing the ecosystem of stablecoins they
have in circulation.147
Finally, when a digital asset can instantly be used for its designated
purpose, it requires no further development, and the SEC is unlikely
to find an investment contract.148 Further, virtual currencies that can
be used as “payments in a wide variety of contexts, or act[] as a
substitute for real (or fiat) currency” are unlikely to be securities.149
Stablecoins can be thought of as virtual currencies, so this section of
the Framework is of particular importance. Stablecoins, however,
cannot be used as a form of payment in any major context, let alone
“in a wide variety of contexts.”150 One cannot walk into their local
coffee shop and buy a cappuccino with stablecoins, nor can one pay
for a book on Amazon with stablecoins. Stablecoins are not a substitute
for real money because they provide different utility and are nonfungible with traditional currency.151 Evidence of their non-fungibility
lies in end-users’ willingness to pay extreme interest rates for
stablecoins.152 While the Framework notes that virtual currencies
acting as a store of value are less suitable to classification as investment
contracts, the Framework does not automatically disqualify such
classification—particularly when there are significant, continuing
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efforts on behalf of an AP to maintain that store of value.153 Because
of the plethora of factors weighing towards an investment contract, it
is unlikely that this single factor will be dispositive.
Even though an asset deriving its value through use looks like a
commodity, the totality of the circumstances and the economic reality
of the transaction show that consumers purchase stablecoins in hopes
of earning a profit, and that profit is contingent on the active efforts
of a third party. This is exactly the type of situation the SEC seeks to
encompass in its Framework.
B. Currency-Pegged Stablecoins as Mutual Funds
While currency-pegged stablecoins satisfy the analysis for an
investment contract, they can also be likened to mutual funds since
they similarly “pool[] money from many investors and invest[] the
money in stocks, bonds, short-term money-market instruments, other
securities or assets, or some combination of these investments.”154
Money market funds aim to maintain a stable value of one dollar per
share and are required by law to invest only in “certain high-quality,
short-term investments issued by the U.S. Government, U.S.
corporations, and state and local governments.”155 Because money
market funds similarly strive to maintain a consistent value, they are
substantively the most similar to stablecoins.156 Not only do both
currency-pegged stablecoins and money market mutual funds attempt
to maintain a consistent value, but they both strive to maintain a value
of one dollar per share or coin.157
Bond funds and alternative funds also mirror stablecoins in their
underlying investment strategies.158 Just as bond funds invest in bonds
and other debt securities, stablecoins often invest in various forms of
debt, such as treasury-bills and commercial paper.159 Similarly, when
stablecoins use traditional currency as collateral, they begin to
resemble alternative funds. The similarities become even more salient
153
See Framework, supra note 5. Something that qualifies “as a store of value” is
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time.” Id.
154
See Mutual Funds and Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs) –– A Guide for Investors, supra
note 98.
155
Id.
156
See id.
157
Id.
158
See id.
159
See, e.g., Reserves Breakdown, supra note 25.

410

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:387

when stablecoins “employ non-traditional trading strategies,”160 such as
algorithms, designed to buy and sell as needed to counter the effects
of supply and demand on the coin’s price.
Because of the wide variety of strategies stablecoins utilize to
maintain their peg, stablecoins currently resemble a hybrid of the
various mutual funds discussed above. Since stablecoins’ attraction lies
in their promise of keeping a value equivalent to one dollar, however,
imposing the same regulations as money market funds may be
necessary for consumer protection. Consumers purchase both money
market mutual funds and stablecoins expecting their value to remain
consistent. Because of consumer reliance on this promise, the SEC has
imposed tight restrictions on money market mutual funds regarding
the types of assets they can invest in.161 Restricting the permissible
assets to high-quality investments prevents spontaneous fluctuations
from the target price, and ultimately helps these funds meet
consumers’ expectations. 162 Imposing these same restrictions on
stablecoins would not only ensure that the investment is free from the
dangers that riskier asset classes pose, but also drive consumer demand
by providing investors with transparency and peace of mind.
Due to the similarities to both investment contracts and mutual
funds, the SEC should release a stablecoin-oriented framework
detailing how they plan to regulate this emerging asset class without
stifling its growth.
V. CONCLUSION
Stablecoins are subject to SEC regulation because of both their
qualification as investment contracts and their resemblance to money
market mutual funds. Stablecoins satisfy the SEC’s Framework for an
investment contract because consumers have a reasonable expectation
of profits derived from the efforts of others.163 Consumers reasonably
expect to profit because the stablecoin issuer advertises the coin’s
ability to earn high interest rates on primary and secondary exchanges.
Further, this profit derives from the efforts of others because an AP
employs significant, complex efforts to maintain the coin’s stable
160
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161
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value. Without those efforts, the coin’s stability would falter, and
institutions would be unwilling to pay the high interest rates
consumers have otherwise come to expect.
Stablecoins, however, also resemble money market mutual funds
in their promise of maintaining a stable value of one dollar per “share”
or “coin.”164 Many stablecoins also employ strategies similar to money
market funds by investing in high-quality, short-term debt.165 Because
stablecoins mirror both investment contracts and money market
mutual funds, the SEC should release further guidance to clarify which
set of regulations stablecoin issuers must abide by and under what
circumstances. Congress should also release a federal framework
detailing the interplay between the agencies so that stablecoin creators
and issuers understand all the various guidelines they must adhere to.
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